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PRESUPPOSING CORRUPTION:ACCESS,
INFLUENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF THE
PAY-TO-PLAY LEGAL FRAMEWORK
ALLISON C. DAVIS
ABSTRACT
Political spending, in all of its various permutations, lies at the
nexus between campaign finance law and pay-to-play law. Both
of these legal doctrines seek to minimize the corrupting effects of
money upon elected officials and candidates, and both impose
various caps and restrictions on political contributions in order
to do so. Over the past half-century, however, the Supreme Court
has struggled to define what sort of activity constitutes corruption 
in the political sphere. In light of its decisions in 2010s Citizens
Unitedv. FEC and 2014s McCutcheon v. FECtwo seminal cases 
that dramatically altered campaign finance regulationthe 
Court now appears to recognize that the act of gaining access to
elected officials via political spending does not constitute quid
pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof. This view has led to
deregulation of the legal framework of campaign finance in recent
years. Furthermore, at present, presupposing corruption on the part
of elected officials or candidates is not always a lawful assumption
upon which laws or regulations governing political spending can
be based. It thus follows that the corruption-based rationale at
the heart of certain federal, state, and local pay-to-play laws may
also be subject to challenge. This Note examines the Courts shift-
ing views on corruption, applies it to various pay-to-play laws
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William & Mary Law School. She wishes to thank the editorialboard and
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currently in effect, and ultimately concludes that the legal and
constitutional framework for much of pay-to-play law, as it
currently stands, rests on shaky ground.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between cam paign finance law and pay-to-
play law two legal doctrines that came into existence in only the 
past half-century is complicated, contested, and changing. Gen-
erally, each field is governed by a differentsetofstatutes and
regulations, butthese two areasofjurisprudenceareneverthe-
lessintertwined. Both em ploy restrictionson politicalcontribu-
tionsin an attempttominimizecorruption between, respectively,
donors and elected officials or candidates, or governm entcon-
tractorsorbiddersandgovernmentofficials.
In addition, pay-to-play laws take many oftheir cues from
cam paign finance law by em ploying the latters m ethods of regu-
lation, including im posing individualand aggregate limits on
contributionsand m andating disclosure. Accordingly, precedent
setforth by litigation related to cam paign financeoften hasan
impactonthelegitimacyandconstitutionalityofpay-to-playlaws.
Overthepastseveralyears, our nations highest court dras-
tically changed the way in which itdefinespoliticalcorruption
ortheappearancethereof. Fordecades, theSupremeCourtad-
hered tothestandard itsetforth in Buckley v. Valeo, a sem inal
cam paign finance case that, inter alia, distinguished between
politicalcontributions and expenditures in the regulatory con-
text.1 Becausedirectcontributionstoelected officialsand candi-
datesforofficewerethoughttoposethedangerofcorruption via
quid proquoexchanges, thegovernm enthad a very compelling
interestin lim itingthem, and courts could apply intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny to laws that limited contributions.2
Meanwhile, theCourtdeemed thatlawscontrolling expenditures
by candidatesorcommitteesmerited strictscrutiny and did not
im posetherisk ofcorruption, buttheCourtdeclined toruleon
whethercorporationscouldm akethem.3 Nearlythirty-fiveyears
afterBuckley (andfollowingalonglineofcasesdebatingthelaw-
fulness ofcorporate politicalexpenditures4), the Courtheld in
1 See generally 424U.S. 1 (1976).
2 Id. at16.
3 Id.
4 See, e.g., First Natl Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that 
astatestatutebanningexpendituresbycorporationsonballotmeasureelections
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Citizens United v. FEC thatunlim itedindependentexpenditures
in support ofofficials and candidates are a form ofprotected
speech that do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption.5 Two monthslater, theUnited StatesCourtofAp-
pealsfortheD.C. Circuitheldin Speechnow.org v. FEC thatthe
governmentlacked a compelling anti-corruption interestin lim -
iting contributionstoindependentexpendituregroups.6 Finally,
fouryearsafterCitizens United, theCourtruledin favorofelim -
inating aggregate lim its (those ithad affirmed in Buckley)on
politicalcontributions in McCutcheon v. FEC, pronouncing that
the governm entm ay only targetquid pro quo corruption (the
directexchange ofan officialactorpromise forrem uneration)
when regulatingin thecam paign financespace.7 Additionally, in
McCutcheon, theCourtheld thataccesstoelected officialsresult-
ingfrom politicalcontributionsdoesnotconstitutequid proquo
corruption ortheappearancethereof.8
These decisions, and their progression toward a narrower
view ofwhatconstitutespoliticalcorruption, posequestionsabout
whetherameaningfulFirstAmendmentdistinctionexistsbetween
aggregatelimitson politicalcontributionsin generalandlimitson
contributionssetforthasaconditionofeligibilityforagovernment
contract, which m anypay-to-playlawsim pose.9 Furtherm ore, if
wasunconstitutional);FEC v. Mass. CitizensforLife, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 239
(1986)(holding thatcorporationsthatexistforthepurposeofdisseminating
information, ratherthan turningaprofit, areexemptfrom theprohibition on
corporate expenditures in candidate elections);Austin v. Mich. Chamberof
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 65455 (1990) (holding that corporations m ay not 
makeindependentexpendituresinconnectionwith statecandidateelections).
5 558 U.S. 310, 314(2010).
6 599 F.3d 686, 69495 (2010). 
7 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (Any regulation must instead target what we 
have called quid pro quo corruption or its appearance.). 
8 Id. at 1438 (Spending large sum s of m oney in connection with elections, 
butnotin connection with an efforttocontrol the exercise of an officeholders 
officialduties, does notgive rise to quid pro quo corruption. Nor does the
possibility that an individual who spends large sum s m ay garner influence 
over or access to elected officials or political parties.). 
9 See, e.g., RebeccaMollFreed, McCutcheon v. FEC: the Potential Impact on
Aggregate Contribution Limits Under Local Pay-to-Play Ordinances, CORP.
POLITICAL ACTIVITY BLOG (Oct. 17, 2013), http:/www.corporatepoliticalactivity
law.com/new_jersey/mccutcheon-v-fec-potential-impact-aggregate-contribution
-limits-local-pay-play-ordinances [http://perma.cc/M6MR-8ZNB] (speculating
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increasedaccesstopublicofficialsisnolongerconsideredaform
ofcorruption, therationaleform any pay-to-play lawsm ay rest
on shakyground.
ThisNoteaddresseswhethertheshiftingstandardsforpolit-
ical corruption embodied by the Suprem e Courts holdings in 
Citizens United, McCutcheon, and otherrecentcasescould lead
to a challenge ofpay-to-play lawsthatseek to preventthe ap-
pearance ofim propriety via restrictions on politicalcontribu-
tions, and arguesthatsuch a challengemay wellbesuccessful.
Additionally, current jurisprudence raises red flags and sets
clear limits for regulators seeking to promulgate pay-to-play re-
strictions, and many pay-to-play laws in effect today are not
properlytailoredtothecauseofpreventingquidproquocorrup-
tion orthe appearance thereof. This Note exam ines provisions
included in the two most prom inent federal pay-to-play laws
SEC Rule 206(4)-5 and MSRB Rule G-3710 as well as provi-
sions in the nations strictest statepay-to-playlaws(in effectin
Connecticutand New Jersey)and new laws proposed by other
government regulatory bodies, such as the Financial Industry
RegulatoryAuthority(FINRA). Although certain aspectsofthese
laws are properly tailored to the goalofpreventing corruption
and thusm ay ultim ately survive judicialreview, notallprovi-
sionscontained therein m eetthestandardssetforth by current
jurisprudence. Hence, atboth thestateand federallevels, these
lawsm aybesubjecttosuccessfulchallenges.
PartI addresseshow theSupremeCourthasprogressedover
theyearsindefiningcorruptionin thecontextofcampaignfinance
regulation. PartII reviewsthe genesisand evolution ofpay-to-
play lawsatthe state and federallevel. PartIII examinesthe
FirstAmendmentproblem sposed by pay-to-play laws. PartIV
discussesadditionalproblem sposedbycurrentpay-to-playlaws.
Finally, PartV focuseson the issuesthatthese lawsmay pose
forcontributorsandcandidatesin futureelections.
thatthe McCutcheon decision could be extended to state pay-to-play laws
thatimposeaggregatecontributionlimits).
10 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-5 (2015);MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD.,
RULE G-37: POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL
SECURITIES BUSINESS, http://www.msrb.org/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB
-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx[http://perma.cc/3NK6-MUV9].
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT, CORRUPTION, AND REGULATION OF
POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Since its origins in the 1970s, cam paign finance law has
framed politicalspending in termsoftheFirstAmendment:such
activityisconsideredcorepoliticalspeech thatisessentialtothe
properfunctioning ofdemocracy.11 The Supreme Courthasap-
plied two differentlevels ofscrutiny in mostm ajor campaign
finance cases:strictand interm ediate. Ifthe Courtchooses to
review a law orregulation centered on independentpoliticalex-
penditures, itm ustapplythehigherstandard ofstrictscrutiny,
which requires that the law be narrowly tailored in the least 
restrictive manner possible to advance a com pelling govern-
mentinterest, with thegoalofsafeguarding protected speech.12
IftheissuebeforetheCourtinvolvescertain typesofcontribu-
tion lim its, however, theCourtmustapplythelowerstandardof
intermediatescrutiny, which onlyrequiresafindingthatthelaw
furthersasufficientlyim portantgovernm entinterestbyem ploy-
ing m eans closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgementof
associationalfreedoms.13
Itisnotalwaysclearwhich levelofscrutiny a courtshould
apply in cam paign finance cases. As politicalcam paign infra-
structuresgrow morecomplex, itbecomesmoredifficulttoclassify
politicalspending as eithera com pletely independentexpendi-
tureora sim plecontribution. Asa result, in theyearsfollowing
the passage of the Federal Election Cam paign Act (FECA), 
courtsareobligated toclarifywhatlevelofscrutinyappliesin a
givencase, aswellaswhichformsofallegedcorruptionconstitute
a compelling stateinterestforthepurposeofregulating m oney
in politics.14
11 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) ([T]his Court has never sug-
gested thatthedependenceofacommunication on theexpenditureofmoney
operates itselfto introduce a nonspeech elementor to reduce the exacting
scrutiny required by the First Am endm ent.). 
12 See generally Ward v. Rock AgainstRacism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989);see
also United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
13 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1444;see also Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Govt PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 386 (2000). 
14 52 U.S.C. §30116 (2015).
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A. The Beginning: Buckleyv. Valeoand Austinv. Michigan
ChamberofCom merce
Asinitiallypassedin 1971, theFECA cappedboth individual
and aggregatepoliticalcontributions, aswellastheexpenditures
thatcould be m ade by candidatesand candidate comm ittees.15
Shortly after its passage, however, the Courtstruck down the
FECAs expenditure lim its in Buckley v. Valeo, holding thatthe
governments compelling interest in preventing corruption or its 
appearance was lim ited to political contributions. Contributions 
were targeted because ofthe perceived dangerofquid pro quo
exchanges between contributors and candidates orelected offi-
cials a risk that did not exist in the context of expenditures.16
Ultim ately, theCourtin Buckley providedthatcorruption orthe
appearancethereofcould betargeted forregulation.17 Moreover,
theCourtheldthatgovernmentallimitation ofcontributionsboth
attheindividualand theaggregatelevelwasanarrowlytailored
approachtowardpreventingsuchcorruption.18
A decade and a halflater, the Supreme Courtappeared to
expand on the definition ofcorruption setforth in Buckley in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce. In Austin, Justice
Thurgood Marshall wrote for the majority, holding that Michigans 
banonindependentexpendituresinstateelectionsbycorporations
wasnarrowlytailoredtothegoalofpreventingtheappearanceof
quid proquocorruption, even though such expenditurescould
notbecoordinated with acandidateoracandidatecommittee.19
Thus, atthe time, although independent expenditures unlike 
contributions could ostensibly bemadewithouttheknowledge
orconsentofacandidate, themerefactthattheycouldsupportor
opposethatcandidatewasenough ofaconnection toposearisk
ofquidproquocorruption.20
15 Id.
16 Buckley, 424U.S. at45, 80.
17 Id. at 13132. 
18 Id. at 26 (It is unnecessary to look beyond the Acts prim ary purpose
to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large
individual financial contributions in order to find a constitutionally sufficient 
justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation.). 
19 Austinv. Mich. ChamberofCommerce, 494U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
20 See id. at 66869. 
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B. The Modern Era: CitizensUnitedv. FEC and McCutcheon
v. FEC
From the beginning, the Roberts Courts approach to previous 
corruption jurisprudencewasmuch m oreskepticalthan thatof
Courtspast. Asa result, the Courtdrew attention to problems
with thedefinition ofcorruption asitstood afterAustin. AsChief
JusticeRobertshimselfnoted in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v.
FEC, a regulatory regime directed at ever-expanding views of
whatconstitutedcorruption ledto the application of prophylax-
is-upon-prophylaxis in a never-ending campaign against cir-
cumvention.21 Such aregimewasboundtofacestiffchallenges.
Thefirstm ajorsalvoagainstthem oreinclusiveBuckley and
Austin standard for corruption arrived with the Suprem e Courts 
rulinginCitizens United, which struckdown thefederalprohibi-
tion on independentpoliticalexpenditures, thesam eprohibition
thattheCourtpreviously found constitutionalin Austin.22 Citi-
zens United didnotaddressdirectcontributionstocandidates, but
thecasedidaddresswhetherindependentpoliticalexpenditures
(which, incidentally, could bemadeby corporationswith contract
businessbeforethegovernment)could lead tocorruption orthe
appearancethereof. Duringoralargum ents, theFEC stipulated
thatthevery premiseoftheindependentexpenditureprohibition
was to prevent individuals or corporations from spending massive 
am ounts of m oney on campaign advertisementsthatcould pos-
sibly havean electoraleffectand lead, in turn, tofavor-seeking
between such entitiesand thecandidatesthey support.23 In the
opinion, however, JusticeAnthonyKennedyappliedstrictscrutiny
and held thatincreased accessresultingfrom independentexpen-
ditureswasnotindicativeofcorruption, and although speakers 
mayhaveinfluenceoveroraccesstoelected officials[, that]does
not m ean that those officials are corrupt.24
Kennedys opinion in Citizens United, which took key cues
from hispriordissentin McConnell v. FEC,25 signaled a break
21 551 U.S. 449, 479 (2007).
22 CitizensUnitedv. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 312 (2010).
23 TranscriptofOralArgumentat47, CitizensUnited v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2009)(No. 08-205).
24 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at314.
25 [Congress m ay] regulat[e] federal candidates and officeholders receipt 
ofquids [butitmaynot]regulat[e]... anyconductthatwinsgoodwillfrom or
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with the Courts prior views aboutwhatactionsand eventscon-
stitute corruption. By indicating that increasing ones access or 
influencetopublicofficialsisnotacorruptact, theCourtdealta
heavyblow totheconceptthatthegovernm enthasacompelling
interest in regulating what it perceives as corruption absent 
actualevidence ofwrongdoing. Furtherm ore, in dicta, Justice
Kennedy cast doubt on whether gaining access through inde-
pendentexpenditureseven bore the aura ofcorruption, stating
that the appearance of influence or access willnotcause the
electorate to lose faith in this democracy.26
Kennedys opinion set the stage for McCutcheon, in which the
Courtremoved certain restrictionson directcontributions, rather
than independent expenditures.27 Although the ruling in
McCutcheon dealtnarrowly with aggregate contribution lim its
anddidnotdirectlyaddresspay-to-playrestrictions, thereasoning
thattheCourtemployed in reachingitsholdinghasthepotential
tothreaten theconstitutionalbasisform anypay-to-playlaws.
In McCutcheon, theCourtexamined whetheraggregatelimits
on politicalcontributions, which weresetat$123,200 overallfor
the 20132014 election cycle,28 couldwithstandintermediatescru-
tiny, and heldthattheycouldnot.29 In apluralityopinion, Chief
JusticeJohn Robertswrotethatlawsthatarenotproperlydrawn
topreventquidproquocorruption ortheappearancethereofcan
and should betrum ped by theFirstAm endment, and lawsthat
attem ptto preventingratiation and accessbetween candidates
and their donors, rather than de facto corruption, do notfall
under this rubric.30 The Courtreasoned thatthe potentialfor
influences a Member of Congress. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 294 (2003) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
26 Id.
27 See generally McCutcheonv. FEC, 134S. Ct. 1434(2014).
28 COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, THE FEC INCREASES INDIVIDUAL CONTRI-
BUTION LIMITS FOR 20132014 (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.cov.com/files/Publi
cation/0fc16100-f79c-4222-8686-00e70bc91845/Presentation/PublicationAttach
ment/7309c948-e64d-4268-82ed-104ad7e1fe45/The_FEC_Increases_Individual
_Contribution_Limits_for_2013-2014.pdf[http://perma.cc/V4VU-TVB5](explain-
ing the increased limits on individual contributions for the 20132014 election 
cycle).
29 See generally McCutcheon, 134S. Ct. at1434.
30 Id. at 1441 (We have said that governm ent regulation m ay not target 
thegeneralgratitudea candidatemayfeeltoward thosewhosupporthim or
his allies, or the political access such support m ay afford.). 
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corruption doesnotincreasewhen adonorcan givethesamecon-
tribution, subjecttotheindividuallim its, tom orecandidatesor
comm ittees than was perm itted under the aggregate lim it.31
Therefore, afterapplying interm ediate scrutiny, the Courtheld
that the aggregate lim its were not sufficiently drawn toward
preventingquidproquocorruption ortheappearancethereof.32 In
essence, First Amendment rights are paramount, and more speech, 
not less is the governing rule forcampaign financeregulation,
unlessthegovernmentcanshow thatacontributionisquidproquo.
ThereasoningthattheSupremeCourtemployedinMcCutcheon
can alsobefound in Dallman v. Ritter, a2010 casein which the
Colorado Supreme Court struck down Am endment 54 to the
ColoradoConstitution.33 Theamendmentprohibited solesource
governm entcontractorsand m embersoftheirimmediate fami-
liesfrom m akingcontributionstopoliticalpartiesortostateand
localcandidates during the duration ofa governm entcontract
and for two years after its conclusion.34 The language ofthe
amendment referred to a presum ption of impropriety between 
contributionstoany campaign and solesourcegovernmentcon-
tracts.35 In otherwords, Amendment54presupposedcorruption
ortheappearancethereof. Thecourtheldthatalthough prevent-
ing theactualityand appearanceofcorruption wasa justifiable
governmentinterest, theappearanceofcorruption alone is not 
sufficienttojustifyanyand allrestrictionson FirstAmendment
freedoms, and the far-reaching and vague language in Am end-
ment54 wasnotproperly drawn tothegoalofpreventing such
corruption.36 AstheSupremeCourtopinedlaterin McCutcheon,
31 Id. at1463:
Equally unpersuasive is Buckleys suggestion that contribu-
tion limits warrant less stringent review because [t]he quantity 
of communication by the contributor does not increase
perceptibly with the size of his contribution, and [a]t m ost, 
thesizeofthecontribution providesaveryrough indexofthe
intensity of the contributors support for the candidate. 
32 Id. at 1449 (To require one person to contribute at lower levels than 
othersbecausehewantstosupportmorecandidatesorcausesistoimposea
special burden on broader participation in the dem ocratic process.). 
33 225 P.3d610, 640 (Colo. 2010).
34 COLO. CONST. art. XXVIII, § 15 (West, Westlaw through Nov. 2014
amendments).
35 Dallman, 225 P.3dat615.
36 Id. at623.
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theColoradocourtalsofound thattherewaslittleevidenceshow-
ingthattheprohibition on contributionsreduced actualcorrup-
tion, and correspondingly, such prohibitions overburdened the
FirstAm endm entrightsofthosetargetedbyAm endment54.37
C. The Appearance of Impropriety and the Coming Debate
Themostrecentcaseembodyingtheideathattheappearance
ofcorruption itselfisa com pelling governm entinterestarrived
in 201415, when the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals adjudicated 
Wagner v. FEC. In Wagner, theplaintiffssoughttochallengethe
constitutionality of the FECAs prohibition against federal gov-
ernmentcontractorcontributionsin connection with federalelec-
tions.38 This prohibition is som ewhatnarrowly drawn;itonly
limitsnaturalpersonswho are federalgovernmentcontractors
from m aking politicalcontributionsand doesnotincludefamily
members.39 The plaintiffs in Wagner argued thatthis law was
overbroad becauseitbanned contributionsby a classofindivid-
ual citizens who are at low risk for corruption those who do not 
win governm ent contracts through a bidding process and thus, 
theFEC failedtoestablish thatthelaw isappropriatelytailored
tothespecificgoalofpreventingcorruption.40 Wagner, likeother
cam paign finance cases, involved a traditional analysis that
weighsspeech viacontributionsagainsttherisk ofquid proquo
corruption ortheappearancethereof.41 In thelead-uptotheD.C.
37 Id. at 633 (These attributes make the potential of pay-to-play corruption in 
acollectivebargainingagreementexceedinglyremote, sothegovernmentlacksa
sufficiently important interest to justify this sort of heavy-handed regulation.). 
38 See generally Wagnerv. FEC, 854F. Supp. 2d83 (D.D.C. 2013), vacated,
717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013), appeal after remand, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
2015)(enbanc).
39 52 U.S.C. §30119 (2015).
40 Complaintat17, Wagnerv. FEC, 717 F.3d1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013)(No. 11-
cv-1841(JEB)):
Becausesection 441ccompletelyprohibitsindividualswith gov-
ernmentcontractsfrom makinganycontributionstocandidates,
politicalcomm ittees, and politicalpartiesin connection with
elections for federaloffices, itis unconstitutionalunder the
FirstAmendmentunlessthereisa compelling governmental
interestin thebanandthebanisnarrowlytailoredtosupport
thatinterest.
41 TelephoneInterview with Kenneth Gross, Partner, & Patricia Zweibel,
Counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher& Flom LLP (Jan. 29, 2015).
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Circuits decision, various campaign finance experts speculated 
thatthe courtwould choose to take its cues from Dallman by
striking down the prohibition on contractorcontributionsasan
overzealous restriction ofprotected First Amendment speech,
enforcedonlyagainstalim itedclass:governm entcontractors.42
In a unanim ousopinion issued in Julyof2015, however, the
D.C. Circuitupheld theban, reasoning thatthepotentialforcor-
ruption thatoriginallyspurredthelaw rem ainedapressingcon-
cern.43 Theopinion engaged in an extensivehistoricalreview of
the problemsposed by politicalpressure vis-à-vispoliticalcon-
tributions and concluded thatpastincidents illustrated thata
ban on contractor contributions was necessary.44 Although the
courtnoted thatthe plaintiffslimited theirclaim to individual
contractorsand conceded thatm ostofitsanalysisinvolved cor-
porate not individual misdeeds, it extended the potential for 
corruption and coercion to these individuals.45 This rationale
ostensibly restsupon the idea thatthe governmentinterestin
preventing the appearance ofim propriety in such situations is
based upon the sam e underlying principles as the 1939 Hatch
Act, which preventscertain governm entem ployeesfrom engag-
ing in politicalcampaign activity.46 Upon closer examination,
however, the Wagner holding also seemed to take many ofits
cuesfrom theassertion thatthegovernmentmayactaggressively
topreventthem ere publicperception ofthe appearanceofcor-
ruption.47 This line ofreasoning seems somewhat unsupported
withrespecttoSupremeCourtprecedent, especiallyMcCutcheon.48
Notably, theWagner courtheldthattotalbanson politicalcon-
tributions should be held to the same level of scrutiny inter-
mediate as m ere limits on such contributions.49 This holding
42 TelephoneInterview withStefan Passantino, Partner, McKennaLong&
Aldridge LLP (Jan. 15, 2015). Passantino characterizes the restriction as
creating a status crim e, in which m embersofa certain class(government
contractors)areprohibitedfrom engaginginotherwiseprotectedspeech.
43 Wagner, 793 F.3d at 1718 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
44 Id. at17 n.21.
45 Id. at28.
46 5 U.S.C. §7323 (2015).
47 Wagner, 793 F.3d at 1516. 
48 See supra notes 3233 and accom panying text. 
49 Id. at22.
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relied heavily upon therationalesetforth in FEC v. Beaumont,
a 2003 Suprem eCourtcasethatupheld an outrightban on cor-
porate political contributions by applying intermediate rather 
than strict scrutiny.50 Since2003, however, Beaumonts rationale 
hasnotsurvivedunscathed. Both Citizens United andSpeechnow
disavowed a hefty portion ofBeaumonts reasoning with respect 
to corporate politicalspending, and McCutcheon further tight-
enedthegap between thecom pellingpublicinterestacam paign
financelaw isintendedtoupholdandtherestrictionsitim poses
onprotectedspeech.51 TheWagner courtreliedheavilyupon case
law thatisquestionablyrelevantin thecurrenteraofcam paign
finance, and although theU.S. SupremeCourtdenied theplain-
tiffs petition for a writ of certiorari in January of 2016, its holding 
in McCutcheon remainsatoddswith theD.C. Circuits rationale 
forupholdingthelaw. 52
Ultim ately, Citizens United, McCutcheon, and theirbrethren
havem oved toward a new doctrine:thegovernm entonly hasa
com pellinginterestin preventingquid proquocorruption orthe
appearance thereof rather than the presupposition of corrup-
tion via restrictions on contributions, and access resulting 
from contributions or expenditures does notconstitute corrup-
tion.53 In the wake ofhigh-profile corruption cases involving
formerVirginia GovernorRobertMcDonnelland form erIllinois
GovernorRod Blagojevich, the Supreme Courtm ay furtherde-
velop thisposition, atleastwith regard tofederalhonestservices
laws.54 In theMcDonnelland Blagojevich cases, theFourth and
Seventh Circuits affirm ed the respective trial courts findings 
50 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 16163 (2003). 
51 See supra discussioninPartI.B.
52 Wagnerv. FEC, 793 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015)(en banc), cert. denied sub
nom. Millerv. FEC (U.S. Jan. 19, 2016)(No. 15-428).
53 LloydHitoshiMayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 801, 82324 (2012). 
54 Kenneth P. Doyle, McDonnell Case Could Shape Corruption Law,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/exp/eyJpZ
CI6IkEwSDVYOFA3VzU/anM9MCZzdWJzY3JpcHRpb250eXBlPWJuYWRlci
Zpc3N1ZT0yMDE1MTEzMCZjYW1wYWlnbj1ibmFlbWFpbGxpbmsmc2l0ZW
5hbWU9Ym 5hIiwiY3R4dCI6IkJCTkEiLCJ1dWlkIjoiOXBicCtCWXlTNmpDR
2p4TndTSm15dz09UHVzZmgyU1M0SzRCTWhNUUZCUkFyQT09IiwidGltZ
SI6IjE0NDg2NzQ4NTQ5NzkiLCJzaWciOiJnZ2RVT09nWk5BS1dRY2VlaDZ
OODlESXhm TkU9IiwidiI6IjEifQ==[http://perma.cc/U3PN-MX9C].
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that McDonnell and Blagojevich traded official acts for rem u-
neration.55 Both governorssubsequently filed separatepetitions
forcertiorariarguing thatthe actions they had taken were not
official acts, but pedestrian politicalactivitiessuchasarranging
meetingsand attendingevents.56 Although McDonnells case in-
volvedfederalhonestserviceslawsratherthancampaignfinance
law (andtheFourthCircuitmadethisdistinction in itsholding57),
bothcasesmerittheattentionofpay-to-playandcampaignfinance
lawyers, given theirfocuson an integralaspectofquid pro quo:
what exactly constitutes an official act. 
TheCourt, however, hasnotforeclosedtheideathatthegov-
ernmentstillhasan interestin preventing actsthatcarry the
merewhiffofcorruption.58 Therefore, thegovernm entmayseek
to regulate politicalmoney in other ways, such as compelled
disclosureregimes. Thereasoningbehind theim position ofsuch
regim es, set forth in Buckley, stillholds:disclosure serves to
detercorruption andfacilitatestheenforcementofotherelection
laws, and thenegativeconsequencesofdisclosureareoutweighed
byitsbenefits.59
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PAY-TO-PLAY LAWS
Pay-to-play laws, like cam paign finance laws, originated in
the 1970s,60 butonly became com m on atthe state and federal
55 United States v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478, 507511 (4th Cir. 2015), cert.
granted, 84U.S.L.W. 3217 (U.S. Jan. 15, 2016)(No. 15-474);UnitedStatesv.
Blagojevich, 794 F.3d 729, 73334 (7th Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, 84
U.S.L.W. 3304(U.S. Nov. 19, 2015)(No. 15-664).
56 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, McDonnell, 792 F.3d478 (No. 15-474);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 910, Blagojevich, 794F.3d729 (No. 15-664).
57 McDonnell, 792 F.3d at 50405. 
58 Mayer, supra note53.
59 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68, 8182 (1976). Additionally, in Novem-
ber of 2015, the United States Suprem e Court declined to review Californias 
§501(c)(3)disclosurerequirements, whichhadbeenupheldbytheNinth Circuit.
Ctr. forCompetitivePoliticsv. Harris, No. 2:14-cv-00636-MCE-DAD, 2014 WL
2002244 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 2014), affd, 784 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, No. 15-152, 2015 WL 4611242 (2015). Although Harris didnotinvolve
electoral activities, the Courts decision not to grant certiorari in that case 
couldbeviewedasabroaderendorsementofm andatorydisclosure.
60 CraigHolm an & MichaelLewis, Pay-to-Play Laws in Public Contracting
and the Scandals that Created Them, PUB. CITIZEN, at4(June26, 2012), http://
www.citizen.org/documents/wagner-case-record.pdf[http:/perma.cc/XTS2-4YZV].
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levelsoverthepasttwodecades.61 Many oftheselawscoverall
individuals and entities engaged in business with the govern-
ment;othersdealsolely with certain sectors, such asmunicipal
securities dealers or investm ent advisers.62 Although various
jurisdictionsinitially proposed and passed theselawsin response
toconcernsaboutthelink between politicalcontributionsand the
procurementprocessforlucrativegovernmentcontracts, pay-to-
playlawsdonotexistforthepurposeofpreventingquidproquo
politicalcorruption, which isalreadyprohibited understateand
federalbriberystatutes.63 Instead, becausequid proquocorrup-
tion in itsplainestform issodifficulttoprove, pay-to-playlaws
aredesignedtoquash theappearanceofcorruption orimpropriety
thatm ay resultwhen individuals and entities engaged in the
procurement process make politicalcontributions to officials in-
volvedin determ iningtherecipientsofgovernmentcontracts.64
A. Federal Laws
Theseedsofmodern federalpay-to-play lawsfirstgerminated
in theearly1970s, afterthepressrevealedthatsittingVicePresi-
dentSpiroAgnew receivedover$100,000 in campaign giftsin ex-
changeforpromisestoinfluencetheawardingofstateandcounty
engineeringcontracts.65 Additionalscandalsfollowedin themid-
1970sand 1980s, when reportsofpay-to-playactivity surfaced in
various states across the nation.66 Ultimately, in September of
1993, representatives ofthe MunicipalSecurities Rulem aking
Board (MSRB)testified before Congressregarding the need for
regulation ofthem unicipalsecuritiesmarket. In thistestim ony,
the MSRBs representatives expressed the need for a specific 
61 Jason Abel, The Next Rule: Pay-to-Play, Municipal Advisors, and
McCutcheon, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (May 14, 2014), http://www.steptoe
.com/publications-9593.html[http://perma.cc/TNF4-4MKM].
62 Id.
63 18 U.S.C. §201 (2014).
64 Stefan Passantino, Did the US Supreme Courts Ruling in McCutcheon v. 
FEC Put the Constitutionality of Some Pay-to-Play Laws in Doubt?, PAY TO PLAY
L. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www.paytoplaylawblog.com/did-the-us-supreme
-courts-ruling-in-mccutcheon-v-fec-put-the-constitutionality-of-some-pay-to-play
-laws-in-doubt[http://perma.cc/GW69-9BK5].
65 Holman& Lewis, supra note60.
66 Id.
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regulatory response to concerns over the appearance of impro-
prietythatcan occurwhen underwritersm akepoliticalcontribu-
tions to   officials with whom they do business.67 Asaresult, in
1994, the MSRB adopted Rule G-37, which prohibits covered
entities, such as brokers, dealers, municipalsecurities dealers,
and their political action committees (PACs), from engaging in 
municipalsecurities business with government issuers within
twoyearsaftertheycontributemorethan a dem inim isam ount
toanofficialem ployedbytheissuer.68
In theyearssinceRuleG-37 took effect, regulatorshavemod-
eled subsequent restrictions upon the MSRBs initial rule. In 2011, 
theSecuritiesand ExchangeCommission (SEC)promulgated the
Advisers ActRule 206(4)-5, which restricts the ability ofinvest-
mentadvisers and theircorporate PACs to make politicalcon-
tributionstocertain covered officials.69 Thelaw aimstoprevent
theselection ofinvestm entadviserstopublicpension fundsand
similarentities by officialswho receive contributions from cer-
tainemployeesoftheadviser, aswellasadviser-controlledPACs.70
Moreover, itprovides fora two-yearban on advisers receiving
compensation for services ifthe adviser or one ofits covered
associatesmakesa non-exemptcontribution to a publicofficial
or candidate with the ability to influence advisory business.71
This com pensation ban includes both investm entmanagem ent
fees and carried interest, meaning thatan investmentadviser
who violates the Rule could surrender m illions ofdollars for
even a singlenon-exemptpoliticalcontribution.72 Rule 206(4)-5
67 JoeMysak, State Treasurers Dredge Up Pay-to-Play Nightmare, BLOOMBERG
(Nov. 26, 2003), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid
=aFhQ6l4Jj_CE&refer=columnist_mysak[http://perma.cc/XD5P-AL9C].
68 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-37:POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND
PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BUSINESS, http://www.msrb.org/Rules
-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx [http:/perma.cc/3NK6
-MUV9].
69 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5(a)(1)(2014).
70 MelanieWaddell, Fair Play: The Fight Over Rule 206(4)-5, INV. ADVISOR
(May 1, 2011), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2011/05/01/fair-play-the-fight-over
-rule-20645?page=3 [http://perma.cc/A6TE-YB4H].
71 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5(a)(1).
72 PoliticalContributions by Certain InvestmentAdvisors, 75 Fed. Reg.
41018, 41048 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) (the adviser 
could instead complywith theRuleby waiving orrebating theportion ofits
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im posesstrictliability, and doesnotmake exceptionsforgood-
faitheffortstocomply;evenasinglecontributioninviolationofthe
Rule could lead to a ban.73 Rule 206(4)-5s expanded scope, as 
wellasitsharsherpenalties, hasled practitionersofpoliticallaw
tocharacterizeitasrepresentingadrasticexpansion ofthepay-
to-play universe, with im plications above and beyond those of
previouslypromulgatedlaws.74
In November of2014, FINRA proposed another pay-to-play
law thatwouldrestricttheabilityofinvestmentadviserswhodoor
seek businesswith governmententitiestom akepoliticalcontri-
butions.75 Theproposedrulebuildsupon Rule206(4)-5 bynotonly
prohibiting thereceiptofcom pensation foradvisory servicesby
violators, butalso by mandating disgorgementofany profits re-
ceivedunderarelationshipdeemedtobeaviolationoftheRule.76
B. State Laws
Many states and localities have enacted their own pay-to-
playlawsin responsetoscandalsinvolvinggovernm entcontrac-
torsand influentialstateofficials.77 Aswith federalpay-to-play
laws, theultimate goalofstate pay-to-play lawsistomaintain
the integrity ofgovernm entcontractproceedingsby preventing
theappearanceofa system thatobligatespoliticalcontributions
from contract bidders that want to secure business from the
governm ent.78 However, these lawsvary dram atically in term s
fees or any performance allocation or carried interest); see also Waddell, supra
note70.
73 Jason Abel, A New Era for Pay-to-Play, ELECTION L. BLOG (June23, 2014,
3:55 PM), http:/electionlawblog.org/?p=62666 [http://perma.cc/MXW6-CYMZ].
74 TelephoneInterview withKennethGross& PatriciaZweibel, supra note41.
75 FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REG. NOTICE 14-50, POLITICAL CONTRI-
BUTIONS:FINRA REQUESTS COMMENT ON A PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH A PAY-TO-
PLAY RULE (Nov. 2014), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc
_file_ref/14-50.pdf[http://perma.cc/C5R9-BVL7].
76 Id. at7.
77 Notable incidents involved, separately, former Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich, former ConnecticutGovernor John Rowland, and former Cali-
fornia Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS)board m ember Al
Villalobos. See Holman & Lewis, supra note 60, at 1213 (referring to Con-
necticut, Illinois, andNew Yorkpay-to-playscandals).
78 See, e.g., KarlJ. Sandstrom & MichaelT. Liburdi, Overview of State Pay-to-
Play Statutes, PERKINS COIE LLP (May 5, 2010), http://www.perkinscoie.com
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ofwhom theycoverand how thoseindividualsorbusinessesare
restricted. Somepay-to-play lawsprovideforcontribution restric-
tionson contractorPACs,79 aswellasthespouses, partners, and
dependentchildren ofcovered individuals.80 Som eapplytostate
party comm ittees, aswellasindividualcandidatecom mittees.81
Someapply only tosolesourceorno-bid contracts, whileothers
applytocompetitive-bidcontractsaswell.82
Asdetailed in PartIV, Section B, Connecticuthasoneofthe
nations strictest state pay-to-play laws, which was enacted in 
thewakeofa publiccorruption scandalthatultimatelyled tothe
conviction offormer Governor John Rowland for conspiracy to
com mithonestservices fraud.83 Under this law, state contrac-
tors, prospective state contractors, and theirprincipalsseeking
state contractsof$50,000 ormore are prohibited from contrib-
uting to orsoliciting contributions on behalfofstate and local
officials, their exploratory com mittees, or state party commit-
tees.84 Principals are broadly defined, and include m em bers of 
the contractors board; individuals owning 5 percent or m ore of 
the com panys stock; individuals living in Connecticut who hold 
/images/content/2/1/v2/21769/wp-10-05-pay-to-play.pdf [http://perma.cc/L89L
-ULLH] ([M]any jurisdictions have enacted laws   with the goal of not only 
maintainingtheintegrityofthecontractingprocess, butalsopreventinga de
facto regime whereby bidders come to believe thatitis necessary to make
politicalcontributionsinorderto obtain governm ent contracts.). 
79 See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE §84308 (West2014);CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-612(f)(1)(F)(West2014);N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A20.13 et seq. (West 
2014)(coveringcontractorPACs).
80 Compare §9-612(f)(1)(F)(coveringspousesanddependentchildren)with 30
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §500/50-37(a)(West2014)(coveringspousesalone).
81 Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-612;W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12 (West
2014)(covering stateand localcandidatesand parties)with IND. CODE ANN.
§4-30-3-19.5 (West2014)(coveringcandidatesforstateoffice, partycommit-
tees, andcaucuses).
82 Compare CAL. GOVT CODE §84308 (no-bid only)with §9-612 (both no-
bidandcompetitivecontracts).
83 In Septemberof2014, formerGovernorRowlandwasconvictedofseven
countsofelection-relatedhonestservicesfraud. See, e.g., AlisonLeighCowan,
Rowland, Ex-Connecticut Governor, Is Convicted in Campaign Finance Case,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com /2014/09/20/nyregion/row
land-ex-connecticut-governor-found-guilty-of-corruption.html[http://perma.cc
/5NC7-V9JK].
84 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-612(f)(2)(A)(B) (West 2014). 
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the title ofpresident, treasurer, or executive vice president;
spouses, partners, and dependentchildren oftheaforementioned;
and politicalcom mitteesestablished by thecontractororany of
theaforementioned.85
New Jerseys pay-to-play law, like Connecticuts, was also 
passedin responsetoabriberyscandal. Thescandalin question
involved a $392 m illion non-com petitive private contract that
was awarded to a com pany thatgave $507,950 to state candi-
datesand com mitteesin the fouryearsprior.86 Thelaw, which
wascodified in 2004, prohibitsallbutdem inimiscontributions
togubernatorialcandidatesand stateand countypartycomm it-
teesby contractors;theirPACsand subsidiaries;theirofficers;
the spouses, partners, and dependentchildren ofofficers;and
any person orentity thatcontrolsmore than 10 percentofthe
contractor.87 Additionally, New Jerseyallowscountyandm unic-
ipalgovernmentstoimposeadditionalpay-to-play lawsasthey
see fit.88 Thishasresulted in a dense patchwork ofregulations
and disclosure requirem ents atboth the state and locallevels,
which hasprompted observerstocharacterize New Jerseys col-
lectivepay-to-playlawsasthetoughestinthenation.89
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Thekeydifferencebetween theaverageindividualwhoseeks
to make a politicalcontribution and a government contractor
who seeksto do so involvesthe matterofchoice in doing busi-
ness. TheSuprem eCourtaffirmed in McCutcheon thatpolitical
contributions are a form ofspeech thatcan currently only be
abridged by individualcandidate and com m ittee contribution
limits.90 Hence, an individualcannotbe prevented from giving
85 Id. at(e)(1).
86 FrancisE. Schiller& W. Cary Edwards, N.J. Enhanced Motor Vehicle
Inspection Contract 62, STATE OF N.J. COMMN OF INVESTIGATION (Mar. 2002),
http://www.state.nj.us/sci/pdf/mvinspect.pdf[http:/perma.cc/YW5C-A854].
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. 19:44A-20.320.7 (West 2014). 
88 Id. at20.26.
89 Colleen ODea, New Jersey: Best score in the country, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Mar. 19, 2012, 12:01 AM), http:/www.stateintegrity.org/newjersey
_story_subpage[http://perma.cc/252W-6EGR].
90 See generally McCutcheonv. FEC, 134S. Ct. 1434(2014).
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up totheindividuallim ittoanynum berofcandidatesand com -
m ittees.91 A government contractor, however, presently has a
choicebetween engagingin businesswith thegovernment, which
subjectsitto additionalrestrictions intended to ensure the in-
tegrity ofthecontracting process, and participating fully in the
electoralprocessviapoliticalcontributions.92
A. The Conditioning of Protected Speech
According tothegovernmentagenciesand statelegislatures
that prom ulgate pay-to-play laws, lucrative governm ent con-
tractsdonotcomewithoutstringsattached, andcontractorsare
freetochoosetheirbusinessin ordertoavoid such conditions.93
Thefactthatcontractorsareengaged in, orareseekingtoengage
in, a business relationship with the governmentadds an addi-
tionaldimension to the relationship between donorand donee,
and potentiallyincreasesthelikelihood thata contribution m ay
influencetheentitythatisawardingthecontract.
Atthefederallevel, thetwom ostextensivepay-to-playlaws,
MSRB Rule G-37 and SEC Rule 206(4)-5, are similarly struc-
tured:both rules contain a two-yearrestriction on covered ad-
visersprovidingcertain typesofservicestoa governm ententity
following a politicalcontribution tocertain governm entofficials
within that entity.94 However, Rule G-37 prohibits m unicipal
securities dealers from providing such services at all, regard-
lessofwhetherrem uneration isinvolved,95 whileRule206(4)-5
prohibitsSEC-registered advisers from providing such services
for compensation.96 Thereason forthisdistinction appearstolie
in thefactthatthem unicipalbond underwriting business(cov-
ered by the MSRBs rule) is transaction-oriented, whereas the
investment advising business (covered by the FECs rule) relies 
91 Id.
92 See, e.g., Waddell, supra note70.
93 See, e.g., Freed, supra note9.
94 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-37:POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND
PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BUSINESS, http://www.msrb.org/Rules
-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx [http:/perma.cc/3NK6
-MUV9];17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5 (2014).
95 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-37, supra note94.
96 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5(a)(1).
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on long-term business relationships between advisers and their
clients.97 Thus, becauseinvestmentadviserscovered underRule
206(4)-5 usuallyhavean ongoingfiduciarydutytotheirclients,
ifan adviserweretomakeacontribution in violation oftheRule,
it could not simply dump the client. Itcould, however, be re-
quired to provide its services for free during the period ofthe
two-yearban.98
1. MSRB Rule G-37
Although the D.C. Circuitupheld Rule G-37 asconstitutional
in Blount v. SEC in 1995,99 this holding and the stipulation 
thatentitiesandindividualscoveredunderRuleG-37 areforced
tochoosebetween exercising theirFirstAm endmentrightsand
engaging in custom ary business activities may no longer apply 
in thewakeofmorerecentjurisprudence.
In Blount, thecourtapplied strictscrutinyand held thatthe
MSRBs rule was narrowly tailored toward addressing the appear-
ance ofquid pro quo corruption.100 In reaching thisconclusion,
thecourtfoundthattheregulations goal was to prevent contribu-
tions as a cover for what is much like a bribe ... intended to induce 
[an official] to exercise his discretion in the donors favor.101
However, in Davis v. FEC, alatercasein which theSuprem e
Court struck down the Millionaires Am endm ent102 tothepub-
lic financing portion ofthe Bipartisan Cam paign Reform Act
(BCRA), the petitioner successfully characterized the govern-
ment as wrongfully requir[ing] acandidatetochoosebetween the
FirstAmendm entrighttoengagein unfettered politicalspeech
and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations.103 Simi-
larly, RuleG-37 forcescovered associatesin themunicipalbond
markettochoosebetween engaging in politicalspeech and sub-
jecting themselvesto extremely burdensome regulationsin the
normalcourseofbusiness.
97 Waddell, supra note70.
98 Id.
99 See generally 61 F.3d938, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
100 Id. at944.
101 Id. at942.
102 BipartisanCampaignReform Actof2002, H.R. 2356, 107thCong. §319(b)
(2002).
103 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771 (2008).
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2. SEC Rule 206(4)-5
The governments penalties for investm ent advisers covered 
underRule 206(4)-5 are hardly a bettersolution than the out-
right ban im posed by Rule G-37. These penalties which essen-
tially force investment advisers accused ofmaking otherwise
legalpoliticalcontributionstofulfilltheirfiduciarydutytoacli-
ent by providing labor for free can beanalogizedtoan unlawful
regulatory taking. Governm enttakingslim itthe use ofprivate
propertytothepointthattheydeprivethelawfulownerofutility
or value,104 whereas Rule 206(4)-5 limits the way in which a
private entity can engage in lawfulbusiness thatcreates such
value.105 Such lim its especially taking into account the amount 
of income lost via foregone fees and carried interest have the 
potentialtoreducetheultimatevalueorutility ofthebusiness
itself. Furtherm ore, ifan investmentadviserweretobeharmed
tothepointthatthebusinessisirreversiblydamaged, theregu-
lation itselfmightconstitute notonly a governmenttaking,106
butalsoan undulynegativem arketforce, asfaraspublicpolicy
isconcerned.
B. The Lawfulness of Influence
In light of the Courts holding in Citizens United (even though
speakers m ay have influence over oraccesstoelected officials[,
that] does not mean that those officials are corrupt107), Rules
G-37 and 206(4)-5 may be open to a strong FirstAmendm ent
challenge. Ifsuch achallengeweretoberaised, theCourtwould
need to determ ine whether the inducem ent that was held un-
lawfulin Blount is sufficiently similar to the influence held law-
fulin Citizens United. If inducement and influence are indeed
thesametypeanddegreeofpressure, then thelineofreasoning
leadingtotheBlount holdingmayprovenullandvoid.
104 John Martinez, GovernmentTakings1 §1 (2014), available at Westlaw
NextRealPropertyTexts& Treatises.
105 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5 (2014).
106 See, e.g., Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 43 S. Ct. 158, 161 (1922) ([O]ne fact 
forconsideration in determiningwhetherthelimitsofthepolicepowerhave
been exceeded is the extent of the resulting dim inution in value.). 
107 CitizensUnitedv. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 314(2010).
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At the MSRBs quarterly meetingin May2014, onlyam onth
afterthe Supreme Courtruled in McCutcheon, thatregulatory
bodys chair appeared to recognize the changed standard for
corruption setforth by the Court, stating thatextending Rule
G-37 to m unicipal advisers would help prevent quid pro quo
politicalcorruption, or the appearance ofsuch corruption, in
public contracting.108 Subsequently, in Septemberof2014, the
MSRB released draftam endmentstoRuleG-37 thatwould ex-
tendtheRulein thismanner.109 Thus, itappearsthatregulators
are beginning to respond to courts by defending existing rules
againsta newer, stricterdefinition ofactualorimplied corrup-
tion. Thatsaid, itseemsunclearwhethermerelystatingthatsuch
rulesareaimedatpreventingquidproquocorruption isenough:
ifinfluenceisallthatsuch contributionsbuy, andinfluencedoes
notlead to quid pro quo corruption orthe appearance thereof,
suchstatementsmaymean littlein thecourseofachallenge.
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR FUTURE PAY-TO-PLAY
CHALLENGES AND RULEMAKINGS
Alongwith theFirstAmendmentconcernsdescribedsupra in
PartIII, stateand federalpay-to-playlawsm ay facechallenges
onseveralotherfronts. First, individualsorentitiesseekingtodis-
putetheselawsmayraiseconcernsthatcertainprovisionsarethe
product of arbitrary and capricious rulem aking. Additionally,
certain laws notably those that extend to the children and rela-
tivesofcovered associates, orallem ployeesofinvestmentadvis-
ers with certain government contracts could be struck down on 
the basis thatthey are overbroad orduplicative ofotherlaws.
Also, due to the high stakes for those who violate pay-to-play
laws, rulemakingbodies(mostnotablytheSEC, which extended
108 PressRelease, Mun. Sec. RulemakingBd., MSRB HoldsQuarterlyMeet-
ing (May 6, 2014), http://www.msrb.org/News-and-Events/Press-Releases/2014
/MSRB-Holds-Quarterly-Meeting-April-2014.aspx[http://perma.cc/N9ZJ-BX7B].
109 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., REQUEST FOR COMMENT ON DRAFT AMEND-
MENTS TO MSRB RULE G-37 TO EXTEND ITS PROVISIONS TO MUNICIPAL ADVISORS
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.msrb.org/~/media/Files/Regulatory-Notices/RFCs
/2014-15.ashx?n=1 [http://perma.cc/R32W-SSAT][hereinafter G-37 Amend-
mentsRequestforComment].
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com pliance deadlines and issued technicalam endm ents after
enacting Rule206(4)-5 dueto widespread confusion among those
covered by the law110)willneed to ensure thatthe language of
these rulesisclearand precise in orderto avoid challengeson
thebasisofvagueness. Finally, thestrictliability provisionsin
m any pay-to-play lawsm ay begquestionsaboutwhetherintent
shouldbeafactorin both theenactmentandenforcementofthese
laws. In otherwords, ifthereisquid, butnopossibilityofpro quo,
istherecorruption?
A. Arbitrariness and Capriciousness
Undergenerally accepted principlesofadministrativelaw, a
governm ent agencys rulemaking conducted undertheAdminis-
trativeProcedureActisreviewed under the arbitrary and capri-
cious standard.111 Underthisstandard, courtsarecom pelled to
review an agencys actions in order to determine whether the 
agency undertook a reasonable effortto exam ine allpertinent
information relatedtotherulem akingandsubsequentlym adea
rationaldecision based on thefactsitfound.112 Agencydecisions
arearbitraryandcapriciousiftheagencyfailstousereasonable
diligencein itsfact-findingefforts, ifitfailstoconsiderrelevant
evidence, orifitbasesitsactionson conclusionsthata reason-
ableperson wouldnotreach.113
TheSEC hasconcededthatRule206(4)-5 may, in thecourseof
itsattem ptsto prohibitunlawfulquid pro quo corruption, also
servetosuppressactivitythatisotherwiselawful.114 In arecent
challengetoRule206(4)-5 filed againsttheSEC bytheNew York
and TennesseestateRepublican parties, theplaintiffsnoted that
110 PoliticalContributionsbyCertain InvestmentAdvisers:Ban on Third-
Party Solicitation;Extension of Compliance Date, 77 Fed. Reg. 35263-01
(June13, 2012)(tobecodifiedat17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
111 5 U.S.C. §706 (2014).
112 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm  Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
113 Id. at43.
114 PoliticalContributions by Certain InvestmentAdvisors, 75 Fed. Reg.
41018, 41022 (July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275) ([Rule 
206(4)-5]thuspermitstheCommission toadoptprophylacticrulesthatmay
prohibit acts that are not them selves fraudulent.). 
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thisconcession blatantly exceedsthe scope of that agencys au-
thority, stating in their com plaint that [t]he SEC is prohibited 
from using its authority to, by rulesandregulationsdefine... acts,
practices, and coursesofbusinessasare fraudulent, deceptive,
or m anipulative to enact rules thatprohibitconductbeyondthat
which is fraudulent, deceptive, or m anipulative.115 Thus, in
promulgating Rule 206(4)-5, the SEC appeared to presuppose
thatallcampaign contributionsfrom covered associatesofinvest-
mentadvisorsareinherentlyfavor-seeking, andthereforesuspect.
Thisfaultylineofreasoningcan beanalogized tothescenar-
io in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., a case in which the
SupremeCourtappliedstrictscrutinytoprovisionsoftheBCRA
thatprevented §501(c)(4)organizationsfrom airing issueadvo-
cacyadswithin thirtydaysofan election.116 TheBCRA, likethe
SECs pay-to-play rule, sought to set a bright-line standard for 
permissiblepoliticalactivityfor§501(c)(4)nonprofitgroups, but
theCourtexplicitly rejected thisstandard asoverreaching, rul-
ing that the desire for a bright-line rule ... hardly constitutes
the com pelling state interestnecessary to justify any infringe-
ment on First Amendment freedom.117 Furthermore, as the
Court stated, [w]here the FirstAmendmentisim plicated, the
tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.118 In itsattemptstosup-
pressunlawfulspeech, thegovernmentm aynotalsoinhibitlaw-
fulspeech.119 As was initially the case with the FEC and the
BCRA, the SEC freely admitted thatitsregulationsencompass
lawfulspeech that is protected under the First Am endm ent.
Thisadmission isarguablyrelevantinform ation thattheagency
failedtotakeintoaccountduringitsrulemakingprocess.
115 Complaintat16, N.Y. Republican StateComm. v. SEC, 70 F. Supp. 3d
362 (D.D.C. 2014)(No. 14-01345)(quoting Schreiberv. Burlington N., Inc.,
472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985));see infra note123.
116 551 U.S. 449, 464(2007).
117 Id. at479 (quoting FEC v. Mass. CitizensforLife, Inc., 479 U.S. 238
(1986)).
118 Id. at474.
119 The Governm ent m ay not suppress lawful speech as the m eans to 
suppressunlawfulspeech. Protectedspeechdoesnotbecomeunprotectedmerely
because it resembles the latter. The Constitution requires the reverse. 
Ashcroftv. FreeSpeechCoal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
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Additionally, the de minimiscontribution limitssetby both
Rule G-37120 and Rule 206(4)-5,121 aswellasm any otherstate
pay-to-play laws, donotseem tobebased on evidenceillustrat-
ingwhytheseam ounts, ratherthan thebasecontribution limits
im posed on allotherindividualsand PACsby theFECA,122 are
sufficienttopreventpay-to-playactivity. NeithertheMSRB nor
theSEC hasprovided guidanceon whetherorwhy theselower
am ounts are setcorrectly. As U.S. DistrictCourtJudge Beryl
Howellsaid during an adjudication hearing in N.Y. Republican
State Comm. v. SEC: [t]he $350 [de minimis limit in Rule 206(4)-5] 
seem s like it cam e out of thin air.123 Thus, accordingtotheap-
propriate standard of review, which fails if the rulem aking
agency does not m eet just one of the criteria, the SECs rulemak-
ingcouldbeconsideredarbitraryandcapricious.
InlateAugustof2015, theD.C. Circuitupheldthe60-daystat-
utory review provision of the Investm ent Advisers Act and, by 
extension, the SECs pay-to-play rule in New York Republican
State Committee v. SEC, holdingthatthisdeadlinewasnotsub-
jecttoequitabletolling.124 However, thecourtacknowledged that
upon presentation ofan as-applied challenge(asopposed tothe
facialchallenge in the case atbar), a districtcourtcould have
120 MUN. SEC. RULEMAKING BD., RULE G-37:POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
AND PROHIBITIONS ON MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BUSINESS, http://www.msrb.org
/Rules-and-Interpretations/MSRB-Rules/General/Rule-G-37.aspx [http://perma
.cc/3NK6-MUV9](setting a de minimislimitof$250 percandidate perelec-
tioniftheindividualcontributingisentitledtovoteforthatofficial).
121 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5(b)(1)(2014)(settingademinimislimitof$350 per
election toofficialsorcandidatesforwhom an individualisentitledtovote, and
$150 perelection to officialsorcandidate forwhom an individualisnoten-
titledtovote).
122 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, CONTRIBUTION LIMITS CHART 2013
2014, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contriblimits.shtml[http://perma.cc
/XQF2-NPUL](Individualsand PACsmay give $2,600 to each candidate or
candidate committee perelection, $32,400 to each nationalparty committee
percalendaryear, and a combined $10,000 tostate, district, and localparty
committeespercalendaryear.).
123 JoshGerstein, Judge Mulls SEC Limits on Political Donations, POLITICO
(Sept. 12, 2014, 6:29 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014
/09/judge-mulls-sec-limits-on-political-donations-195402.html[http://perma.cc
/AWG5-B3SS].
124 799 F.3d 1126, 113435 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
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jurisdiction toreview theruleundertheConstitution and/orthe
AdministrativeProcedureAct.125
Therefore, theconstitutionalconcernsposedbytheplaintiffs,
aswellasthe question ofwhethera particularpay-to-play rule-
makingisarbitraryand capricious, remain liveissuesforfuture
courtstoconsiderin thecontextofconcreteclaims. In addition, it
ispossiblethattheplaintiffsin thiscasewillpetition theUnited
StatesSupremeCourtforawritofcertiorariinthecomingmonths.
B. Overbroadness and Inadequate Evidence
With regardtopay-to-playrestrictionsin certain jurisdictions,
evidenceexiststhatcorruption occurred in thepast. Notably, in
Green Party of Connecticut v. Garfield, theSecondCircuitupheld
Connecticuts pay-to-play ban barringstatecontractorsfrom con-
tributingtothecampaignsofstatecandidates, stating:
[B]ecause the recent corruption scandals in Connecticut
created the appearance ofcorruption with respect to all ex-
changes ofmoney between state contractors and candidates
for state office ... [the] outright ban on contractor contri-
butions was justified (i.e., closely drawn to m eet the states 
anticorruption interest) because even a severe limit on con-
tractorcontributionswouldallow asmallflow ofcontributions
between contractors and candidates and would, as a result,
likelygiverisetoanappearanceofcorruption.126
SEC Rule206(4)-5 alsoaroseoutoftheashesofscandal:in the
early 2000s, New York State com ptrollerAlan Hevesiwascon-
victedofacceptingbribesinexchange for investments in his states 
pension fund.127 In Blount v. SEC, theMSRB and SEC success-
fullydefendedRuleG-37 againstaFirstAmendmentchallengeby
providingextensivedocumentation ofpay-to-playpracticesamong
investment, securities, andmunicipalfinanceentities.128
Previoussuccessfulchallengestolawsbanningcontributions
by a specific class seized on the governm ents inability to show 
125 Id. at1136.
126 616 F.3d189, 206 (2dCir. 2010).
127 MarcLifsher, New York State Pension Fund Trustee Pleads Guilty to
Taking Bribes, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct
/07/business/la-fi-hevesi-20101007 [http://perma.cc/Z6ZB-9WHN].
128 See generally 61 F.3d938, 939 (1995).
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thatcertain provisionsofthoselawsprevented corruption, thus
provingthatthelaw wasoverbroad. Forexample, in McConnell
v. FEC, the Supreme Court overturned the BCRAs ban on polit-
icalcontributionsfrom minors, holdingthatthegovernmentfailed
toassertampleevidenceofcorruption viaconduit;thatis, parents
donating in their childrens namesin ordertocircumventcontri-
bution limits.129 Thisholding could lend supportto a challenge
of Connecticuts or New Jerseys pay-to-play laws (absent a track 
record in those states of parents contributing in their childrens 
nam es), both ofwhich prohibit dependent children ofcovered
associatesfrom m akingpoliticalcontributions.130
C. Duplicative Laws
Many pay-to-play laws prohibitcontributions notonly from
individualswhoaredirectlyinvolved in thecontractingprocess,
butalsofrom theirfamilymembersandworkcolleagues.131 Family
membercontribution restrictionsexistin orderto preventcon-
tractorsfrom funnelingmoneytogovernmentofficialsin thename
oftheirspouseorchildren, butlawsthatprohibitthispossibility
are already on the books:federalelection law currently enjoins
any person from m aking a politicalcontribution in thenam eof
anotherperson, orfrom knowingly perm itting theirnametobe
usedtoaffectacontribution byanotherperson.132
In Citizens United, theSupremeCourtnoted theduplicative
natureoflawsthatprohibitcertain contributions,133 anditisquite
possiblethatthepresenceofanti-briberyandanti-fraudlawsmay
leadcourtstoconcludethatfurtherrestrictionsareunnecessary.
Notably, in McConnell, the Court held that the governm ents 
failure toproduce adequate evidenceofparentscontributing in
129 540 U.S. 93, 232 (2003) ([T]he Government offers scant evidence of this 
form  of evasion.). 
130 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-612(e)(1)(West 2014);N.J. STAT. ANN.
19:44A-20.6 (West2014).
131 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 121.330(3)(4) (West 2014) (relating to prohi-
bitionson politicalcontributionsfrom immediatefamilymembers);VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, §109(a)(West2014)(relatingtoprohibitionson contributionsfrom
employeeswithresponsibilitytoprovideinvestmentservicesofanykind).
132 52 U.S.C. §30122 (2015).
133 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (The practices 
Buckleynotedwouldbecovered by bribery laws.). 
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thenamesoftheirchildren likelystemmed from thefactthatthe
FECA alreadyprohibited individualsfrom m akingpoliticalcon-
tributionsin thenam eofanother, rendering therestrictionson
minors contributions redundant.134
Additionally, som e pay-to-play laws contribution bans in-
cludeallofficersofa com pany with businessbeforethegovern-
ment, regardlessofwhetherthoseindividualsplaya rolein the
procurem entprocess. Forexample, under New Jerseys pay-to-
playlaw, itispossiblethatan officerworkinghalfwayacrossthe
country in an unrelated division ofa company thatengagesin
governmentprocurementcould be prohibited from making cer-
tain politicalcontributions.135 Such restrictionsappeartobeon
shaky ground in lightofholdings, such as thatin Dallman v.
Ritter, which view blanketprohibitionson contributionsskepti-
callyabsentdirectevidenceofcorruption orthelikelihoodthereof,
ratherthan pure presupposition.136 Furthermore, the Supreme
Courts stipulation that courts should respect the doctrine of 
more speech, not less,137 especiallyin caseswherean individual
hasvirtually nocontroloverthecontracting process, could lead
to increased scrutiny regarding whether these restrictions are
closely drawn toservean anti-corruption purpose. Becauseitis
alreadyillegalunderfederallaw tomakeapoliticalcontribution
in the name ofanother, courtsmay look skeptically upon laws
thatsim plyduplicatewhatisalreadyon thebooks.138
Commenters on FINRAs proposed pay-to-play rule (described 
supra in PartII, Section A)havealsoexpressedconcern aboutthe
rules disgorgement provision.139 Presently, neitherRule 206(4)-5
134 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 232, 245 (Perhaps the Governments slim evi-
dence results from  sufficient deterrence of such activities by § 320 of FECA.). 
135 N.J. STAT. ANN. §19:44A-20.6 (When a business entity is other than a 
naturalperson, acontribution byanyperson orotherbusinessentityhaving
an interest therein shallbe deemed to be a contribution by the business
entity.). 
136 See, e.g., 225 P.3d610, 623 (Colo. 2010).
137 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 259 (2002)
(Thom as, J., concurring) (The Governm ent m ay not suppress lawful speech 
as the m eans to suppress unlawful speech.).
138 See supra text accompanying notes 13132. 
139 SIFMA, RE:FINRA REGULATORY NOTICE 14-50 11 (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://www.sifma.org/comment-letters/2014/sifma-submits-comments-to-finra-on
-regulatory-notice-14-50-relating-to-pay-to-play-practices/[http://perma.cc/J2ZT
-DYXV].
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norRuleG-37 mandatesdisgorgem ent, andinvestmentadvisers
who discoverpotentialpay-to-play violations typically disgorge
any paym ents received under the problematic arrangem entin
question on a voluntary basis.140 By m andating disgorgement,
som e practitioners have speculated that FINRAs rule could pose 
an undue penalty forinvestmentadviserswhohavealready in-
ternally discovered and rectified pay-to-play problems in good
faith.141 This could effectively detersuch firm s from voluntary
disgorgem ent.142 Other practitioners, however, have expressed
doubtthatthe disgorgem entprovision would affectinvestment
advisers willingness to self-rectify potential violations, as regulat-
ing entities tends to refrain from further enforcem ent action
againstpotentialviolators once they disgorge allfees in ques-
tion.143 However, these sam e practitioners acknowledge that
disgorgementhasthepotentialtobea heavyand disproportion-
atepenalty, especiallyin situationswherean investmentadviser
doesnotknowinglyviolateapay-to-playlaw.144
D. Void for Vagueness Problems
Anotherpotentialissueforfuturelitigation involvesdefining
whofallsundertheaegisofpay-to-playlawswithoutover-covering
orleavingroom forloopholes. SEC Rule206(4)-5 hasdrawn criti-
cism forwhatm anyperceiveasan inadequatedefinition ofwhat
constitutes a covered associate under that law.145 A covered 
associate of an investment adviserisdefinedasanygeneralpart-
ner, m anaging m emberorexecutive officer, orotherindividual
140 INV. CO. INST., RE:FINRA NOTICE 14-50 RELATING TO PROPOSED PAY-
TO-PLAY RULES 5 (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files
/notice_comment_file_ref/p602179_0.pdf[http://perma.cc/VUU8-J2DJ].
141 SIFMA, supra note139, at11.
142 INV. CO. INST., supra note140, at5.
143 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Gross & Patricia Zweibel, supra
note41.
144 Id.
145 Waddell, supra note 70 (The SEC received nearly 800 com m ent letters 
stating that the Rule was too broad in defining who is a municipal advisor). 
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with asimilarstatusorfunction;anyemployeewhosolicitsagov-
ernm ententity forthe investmentadviserand any person who
supervises, directly orindirectly, such employee;and any politi-
calaction com mitteecontrolled by theinvestm entadviserorby
any of its covered associates.146 Practitioners of political law
haveexpressedconfusion overwhetherthisonlycoversthosewho
solicitmunicipalitiestoinvest with theadviser, orifitalsocovers
thosewhosolicitmunicipalitiestobecome clients oftheadviser.147
Although both involve a business relationship, the potentialre-
wards from investmentm anagem entfees and carried interest
arefargreaterthanmonthlyretainerfees.
Initially, theSEC stated thatitwould notadopta proposed
amendment to the definition of covered associate, which replaced 
the word individual with the word person so that a legal entity, 
not just an actualperson employed by the adviser, would be
considered a covered associate.148 However, thefinalrulemis-
takenlyreflectedtheproposedchange: the word individual was 
replaced incorrectly by the word person, and the SEC was forced 
to make a technical am endment to the Rule for claritys sake.149
Proposed amendmentstoRuleG-37 alsohaveled toconcerns
overdefinitionalvagueness. Although theam endmentsattem pt
to clarify which governm ent entities are encom passed by the
regulation by replacing the term  official of an issuer with offi-
cial of a municipal entity,150 theyalsocoverincumbentsand can-
didates for elective office ... directly or indirectly responsible for, 
or [who] can influence the hiringofacovered municipalsecuri-
tiesbrokerordealer.151 TheRuledoesnotaddresswhatconsti-
tutes indirect influence or responsibility, nor does itprovide
titles or articulated standards (beyond this vague definition)
146 17 C.F.R. §275.206(4)-5(f)(2)(2014).
147 Waddell, supra note70.
148 TechnicalAmendmenttoRule206(4)-5:PoliticalContributionsByCer-
tain InvestmentAdvisers, 77 Fed. Reg. 28,476 (May15, 2012)(tobecodified
at17 C.F.R. pt. 275).
149 SEC Makes Technical Amendment to Definition of Covered Associates 
Under Pay to Play Rule of the Advisers Act, BRACEWELL & GUILIANI (June7,
2012), http:/www.bracewellgiuliani.com/news-publications/updates/sec-makes
-technical-amendment-definition-covered-associates-under-pay-play [http://perma
.cc/H83R-UKWE].
150 See G-37 AmendmentsRequestforComment, supra note109.
151 Id.
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concerning specificcovered officials.152 Ifinvestmentadvisersare
not reasonably able to determ ine what practices the Rule re-
quiresand forbids, the proposed am endm entscould potentially
be held void forvagueness on the theory thatthey violate the
DueProcessClause.153 FortheRuletowithstand achallengeon
thisbasis, the MSRB and otherregulators willneed to ensure
thatsuchdefinitionsareclearlystatedfrom theoutset.
E. Strict Liability Issues
Finally, it is possible that SEC Rule 206(4)-5s strict liability 
provision m ay com eunderattack in futurelitigation. Indeed, if
theaim ofsuch lawsistopreventcorruption, how should courts
approach situations in which an investment adviser makes a
contribution thatcannotpossiblyundulyinfluencethecontracting
process?Politicallaw practitionershave noted thatthese strict
liabilityprovisionscouldseverelypenalizecoveredindividualswho
do notmake the consciousdecision to violate pay-to-play laws,
butratherinadvertently violate them by giving a politicalcon-
tribution to, forexample, aformercollegeroommateorfriendwho
isrunningforoffice.154
In atleastonecase, theSEC hasinterpreted itsown pay-to-
play law in thebroadestpossiblem anner, directly violating the
tailoring requirementsforpoliticalcontribution restrictionsset
forth bytheSuprem eCourt.155 In 2014, theSEC broughtaction
againstan investmentadviserthatmadecontributionstoofficials
employed by a governmentissuer.156 However, the issueritself
was already invested in and comm itted to the fund, the fund
itself was in wind-down mode, and the government did not allege 
thatthe investmentadvisersoughtto marketadditionalfunds
within two yearsofthe contributionsin question.157 Therefore,
the contributionsdid nothavean impropereffecton the issuer
152 See, e.g., G-37 AmendmentsRequestforComment, supra note109.
153 See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) ([a law] is un-
constitutionally vague[if]itsubjectstheexerciseoftherightofassembly to
an unascertainable standard). 
154 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Gross & Patricia Zweibel, supra
note41.
155 TelephoneInterview withStefan Passantino, supra note42.
156 See generally TL Ventures, Inc., 3859 S.E.C. 3-15940 (2014).
157 Id.
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becausetherewerenoinvestmentdecisionsthattheissuercould
havemadebeyond thatpointin time. Thisnullified theidea that
corruption couldpossiblyhaveoccurred.
TheFEC, foritspart, firsttouched on theissueofstrictlia-
bilityforfederalcontractorsmakingcontributionsrelatedtofed-
eralelections(in violation oftheFECA)in a2011 MatterUnder
Review (MUR), or agency enforcement action.158 According to
theMUR, severalAlaskacorporations, which thegovernmental-
legedtobefederalcontractors, madecontributionstoan indepen-
dentexpenditure-onlycommitteesupportingincum bentSenator
Lisa Murkowskiduring the 2010 election cycle.159 Ultim ately,
theFEC determ inedthat, although thecorporationsappearedto
befederalcontractorsand did in factengagein governmentcon-
tracting, they were unaware ofthe government lease arrange-
mentsthatgavethem federalcontractorstatus.160 Furthermore,
the money paid by the federalgovernmentto these corporations
was relatively small161 and appeared to prim arily benefitthe
publicinterest.162 Finally, theindependentexpenditure-onlycom -
mitteeitselfwasnotfoundtohave coordinated with Murkowskis 
cam paign.163 In theend, forthesereasons, theFEC chosetoex-
erciseitsprosecutorialdiscretion and dismissthechargesagainst
thecorporationsaccused ofimproperactivityundertheFECA.164
Thus, at the agency level, the FECs more discretionary enforce-
mentofitsown rulesrelating totheprevention ofcorruption lies
in contrast to the SECs strict liability approach. 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE ELECTIONS
Pay-to-play lawshave the potentialto affectboth state and
federalelections, includingpresidentialelectionsin which oneor
more candidatesisa covered state official. Indeed, New Jersey
158 FEC MUR 6403 (AlaskansStandingTogether), Complaint(2011).
159 Id.
160 FEC MUR 6403 (AlaskansStandingTogether), Certification(2011).
161 Weekly Digest: Week of November 28 to December 2, FEC (Dec. 2, 2011),
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2011/20111202digest.shtml [http://perma.cc/577B
-UDN8].
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 See FEC MUR 6403, Certification, supra note160.
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governorChrisChristie, a 2016 presidentialcandidate, hasfaced
accusationsthata board mem berofthe financialservicesfirm
Prudentialplctradedcontributionsfora$300 millionNew Jersey
statepension m anagem entcontract.165 Such presidentialcandi-
datesm ay also facepotentiallegalconflictswhen they exitthe
primaryandreturntoofficeintheirhomestate.166
Atthecongressionallevel, pay-to-playlawsareverylikelyto
have an impacton House and Senate races:congressionalcan-
didatesareoften drawn from theranksofthestatelegislature,
and theselawscould stifle theability ofcandidatesto com pete
for federaloffice ifthey are sitting legislators in a state with
strictpay-to-play laws.167 Atthe presidentiallevel, in the past,
potentialcandidateshave responded to the possibility ofbeing
affected by pay-to-play lawsby notrunning atall,168 orby not
selectingacoveredstateofficialasarunningm ate.169
Thatsaid, even candidateswho resign from a covered state
position and are legally qualified to receive contributions from
individualsand PACsconnected with investmentadvisersm ay
face an uphillbattle in garnering contributions. Because the
penalties for violating pay-to-play laws are severe, risk-averse
coveredadvisersmaychooseinsteadtositon thesidelineswhen
165 David Sirota, Matthew Cunningham -Cook & Andrew Perez, Chris
Christie Officials Sent Pension Money to Subsidiary of Donors Foreign Firm,
INTL BUS. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/chris-christie
-officials-sent-pension-money-subsidiary-donors-foreign-firm-1847744 [http://
perma.cc/JJE8-26H5].
166 During the2016 presidentialelection cycle, thesecandidatesincluded
Christie, Wisconsin GovernorScottWalker, OhioGovernorJohn Kasich, and
Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal. Heather Haddon & Rebecca Ballhaus,
State Contractors Aid Governors Campaigns, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/state-contractors-aid-governors-campaigns-144054
7616 [http://perma.cc/L2KB-JTDZ].
167 Telephone Interview with Kenneth Gross & Patricia Zweibel, supra
note41.
168 TelephoneInterview withStefan Passantino, supra note42.
169 Pundits suspect that New Jerseys strict pay-to-play laws m ay have 
been a factor in Mitt Rom neys decision not to select New Jersey governor 
Chris Christie as his pick for Vice President. See, e.g., Lois Romano, Balz
book: Christie considered 2012, POLITICO (July2, 2013, 1:55 PM), http://www
.politico.com/story/2013/07/dan-balz-book-chris-christie-2012-93663.html [http://
perma.cc/H35U-KN2L](referring to a book by Washington Postchiefcorre-
spondentDanBalzrecountingthe2012 Presidentialcampaign).
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astateofficialrunsforfederaloffice.170 Thiseffectivelyputsthose
candidates(such asformerstategovernors)atacompetitivedis-
advantage with relation to other candidates (such as Senators
andCongressmen).171 Giventhefactthatstategovernorshipsarea
com mon springboard forthePresidency,172 aswellasthesheer
amountoffundsneededtorun asuccessfulcampaign, thiscould
have tremendousim plicationson who choosesto run forPresi-
dent, aswellaswhichcandidatesultim atelywin thefundraising
war and perhaps the nations highest office. 
Anotherkey matterthatfuturecourtsm ay addressinvolves
whether federalcontractors m ay give to independentexpendi-
ture-only comm ittees, orSuperPACs. Such PACshavealready
proven tobetremendouslyinfluentialin the2016 election cycle,173
and willlikely continue to hold a greatdealofsway in federal
electionsfortheforeseeablefuture. Thisissuehasnotyetbeen
litigated:notably, theplaintiffsinWagner v. FEC (discussedsupra
in PartI, Section C)explicitlylimited thescopeoftheirclaim to
excludeSuperPACs.174
TheFEC, foritspart, hasdeclinedtofindreasontobelievethat
acontribution toasuperPAC from an entityallegedtohaveties
toagovernmentcontractorwouldconstituteaviolation offederal
election laws. In a bipartisan voteon a MUR in 2014, theFEC
dism issed charges alleging that Chevron Corporation violated
thefederalcontractorcontribution ban bycontributingtoan in-
dependentexpenditure-onlycomm ittee.175 Accordingtothefacts
ofthe enforcem entm atter, Chevron USA, a wholly owned sub-
sidiary ofChevron Corporation (which made the contribution),
ownedasubsidiarythatownedanothersubsidiarythatowneda
170 Wary investment advisers with no desire to test opaque pay-to-play laws 
mayusetheselawsasan excusenottogivetocertain cam paigns, even ifthe
contribution iscompletelylegal. TelephoneInterview with Stefan Passantino,
supra note42.
171 Carrie Dann, Competitive Disadvantage?: Pay-to-Play Rules and the 
2016 Stakes, NBC (Jan. 15, 2015, 1:36 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics
/first-read/competitive-disadvantage-pay-play-rules-2016-stakes-n286936 [http:/
perma.cc/BQ8B-VYUN].
172 Four out of the past six presidents George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, 
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federalcontractor.176 In sovoting, theFEC appeared toconcede
thatifa parentcompany thatmakesindependentexpenditures
receivessufficientfundsfrom sourcesotherthan itsfederalcon-
tractorsubsidiary, suchexpendituresarepermissible.177 Moreover,
in Novemberof2015, theFEC deadlocked on whethertopursue
apetition forrulem akingthatwouldpreventsubsidiariesofgov-
ernment contractors from contributing to super PACs.178 Cam-
paign financeexpertshaveflagged theoutcom eofMUR 6276, as
wellasthe failed rulem aking petition, ashighlighting the doc-
trinalfragilityofthefederalcontractorbanin certaincases.179
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Courts decisions in Citizens United and
McCutcheon shifted thestandardbywhich alleged corruption in
politicsismeasured. Based on thisjurisprudence, itappearsthat
the Courtwillcontinue to limitthe definition ofcorruption to
actsthatinvolve, orappeartoinvolve, a quid proquoexchange
ofcontributionsin exchangeforofficialactsorprom ises, atleast
forthepurposesofcampaign financelawsand regulations. Fur-
thermore, access to or influence upon government officials or
candidates resulting from contributions or expenditures does not
at least as far as the Court is concerned constitute corruption.180
Currentpractitionersofpoliticallaw haveacknowledgedthat
theholdingin McCutcheon hasraised thebar, asfarasregulat-
ingpoliticalcorruption isconcerned.181 When thatbarisraised,
thequestion ariseswhetherapenalty(such astheoneimposedby
176 Id. at 13. 
177 Id. at7.
178 FEC Refuses to Close the Chevron Loophole in the Ban Against Cam-
paign Contributions from Government Contractors, PUB. CITIZEN (Nov. 11,
2015), http:/www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=5729 [http://
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180 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1438 (2014) ([a]ny regulation must 
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Rule206(4)-5)ratherthan a simpleban (such astheoneimposed
by Rule G-37) is an undue restriction of investm ent advisers 
FirstAmendmentrights.182 Indeed, when RuleG-37 waspromul-
gated, regulatorswereallegedlycarefultogiveinvestmentadvis-
erstheoption ofdoingcontractbusinessormakingcontributions,
rather than simply imposing a penalty thatcould overburden
theirFirstAmendm entrights.183
Thus far, the Courts jurisprudence has notspecifically ad-
dressedRule206(4)-5, andtheunderpinningsofitsearlieropinion
upholding Rule G-37 have shifted as well. Ifthe Court does
eventually addressthese laws, the sameconstitutionaland ad-
ministrativeprinciplesprotectingpoliticalspeech, expenditures,
and contributions m ay apply to pay-to-play laws, given their
intertwinementwith campaign financelaws. In theend, ifcourts
choose to apply the sam e FirstAmendmentanalysisto pay-to-
play lawsasthey dotocampaign financelawsand regulations,
thecompellingstateinterestbehindthepay-to-playlegalframe-
work that is, the presupposition of corruption m ay well com e 
intoquestionin thenearfuture.
182 Id.
183 Id.
